Former NSA Official Warns Chinese-Made Solar Panels on US Farms May Threaten National Power Grid

Concerns over the security of American infrastructure heightened this week after it was revealed that rogue communication devices were discovered inside Chinese-made solar power inverters installed throughout the United States. According to experts familiar with the matter, these devices—absent from official product documents—raise alarms about potential vulnerabilities that could be exploited to disrupt U.S. commerce and critical systems.

The power inverters, which serve as the crucial link between solar panels and the U.S. electric grid, were found to contain undocumented communication channels. Security specialists warn that such hidden channels may allow unauthorized remote access, potentially circumventing established cybersecurity protections like firewalls. The findings have set off fresh debates about the risks associated with foreign-manufactured technology embedded in sensitive infrastructure.

Rocky Cole, a former National Security Agency analyst, described the incidents as "very conceivable" evidence of a broader effort by China to implant hardware capable of providing access to American infrastructure. “It very much fits into the model of China implanting hardware in American critical infrastructure for the purpose of planning cyberattacks against the United States in the event of, say, a conflict with Taiwan or something along those lines,” Cole explained. He stressed the significant threat posed by communications devices placed in strategic locations, warning, “It's difficult not to view Chinese-made hardware in the realm of critical infrastructure as a national security threat in my mind.”

Adding to those concerns, one expert noted that the discovery included cellular radios embedded within batteries supplied by multiple Chinese manufacturers. These types of covert components, placed without customer knowledge, are particularly troubling because Chinese law obligates companies to cooperate with intelligence agencies when requested. Such requirements further complicate efforts to ensure the security and integrity of imported infrastructure hardware.

In response to mounting scrutiny, a spokesperson for the Chinese Embassy in Washington, D.C., reiterated China's commitment to peaceful development and rejected allegations of espionage. “We oppose the presumption of guilt under unclear facts, the generalization of the concept of national security, and the distortion and smear of China's achievements in the field of energy infrastructure," the statement read.

Security analysts maintain that the risk extends beyond the specific case of solar inverters. Cole stressed that any reliance on international supply chains—especially those outside the U.S. or allied countries—creates opportunities for so-called “supply chain operations.” In these scenarios, intelligence operatives may coordinate with manufacturers to insert backdoors into hardware during the production process. “Without strict oversight of supply chains, it becomes very difficult to certify with any confidence that your hardware doesn’t contain these backdoors,” Cole warned. He emphasized the critical importance of awareness and vigilance among American officials tasked with protecting the nation's vital infrastructure.

The revelations have sparked calls for more rigorous inspection and oversight of foreign-produced technology destined for the U.S. energy sector. As investigations continue, officials and industry leaders are weighing additional safeguards to prevent the installation of compromised equipment—a concern that only grows as global tensions escalate and the push for clean energy intensifies.